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

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Nigeria - Untapped potential

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Nigeria – Untapped potential

Thanks to a wealth of oil and human resources, Nigeria has the potential to become one of Africa's leading economies. But years of mismanagement and social division have paralysed the giant of Africa. Real GDP growth was projected to rise slightly in 2001 to 4.0%, up from 3.8% in 2000, largely as a result of improvements in the non-oil sector. The oil sector was hurt by a slump in oil prices and by oil production constraints imposed by the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The current growth projection of 4% falls far short of the 6–10% promised at the start of President Olusegun Obasanjo's administration—and of the 7–10% growth required to make a significant dent in poverty and to achieve the international development goals for 2015. As a result, Nigeria's position in global poverty rankings has improved little over the years, and the government faces mounting pressure to make good on its promise of "democracy dividends".

Driven largely by an oil windfall, external accounts improved significantly in 2000. Exports maintained the strong growth started in 1999 (58% in 1999 and 64% in 2000), providing the foreign exchange needed to finance the massive (181%) growth in imports in 2000. The strong growth in export revenue—and thus in import demand—is unlikely to be sustained in the short to medium term, since oil prices are not expected to recover to their 2000 level. As a result of the downward trend in oil prices and further production restrictions by OPEC, export earnings are expected to fall significantly in 2002. Tax revenue from the oil sector helped to support a sharp rise in public investment spending in 2000. In addition, inspection of imports rose to 100%, significantly increasing revenue from import duties and offsetting what could have been a significant budget deficit for 2000. The government budget for

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2001 had envisaged even greater capital outlays (around 50% more than in 2000 and 250% more than in 1999). But the introduction of procurement rules and value-for-money audits of capital projects helped to slow capital spending and prevent waste.

The medium-term outlook for the economy is unfavourable. Real GDP growth is projected to slow to around 2% in 2002, as a result of a reduction in OPEC quotas at the beginning of the year and an expected slump in oil prices. Declining investor interest—especially in privatized companies—and increasing social and political tensions may exacerbate the slowdown. Still, increased investor activity in offshore oil and gas projects and expected improvements in agricultural output might help keep the economy from registering negative growth. The biggest threat to the economy is the country's structural vulnerability—governance problems, volatile oil prices, ethnic and religious tensions, and unpredictable relations with the donor community.

According to the 2002 budget statement, Nigeria's policy reforms are expected to continue to focus on four main themes: pursuing sound economic management, improving the condition of public infrastructure, diversifying the economy while emphasizing poverty reduction, and increasing integration with the regional and global economies. The successful rescheduling of external debt with the Paris Club of bilateral creditors and the extension of the Stand-By Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will also be key to ensuring better growth performance in 2002. And as oil prices fall, fiscal prudence will be required. But the constitutional right of local governments to a share of federally collected revenue and the inability of the federal government to constrain spending by lower levels of government make it difficult for the federal government to manage oil windfalls or to devise a fiscal rule to smooth national consumption after a windfall. Thus in the next few years Nigeria's economic performance will be tied to the efficiency and effectiveness with which the government tackles the country's public sector resource management issues. The task of turning around the Nigerian economy is daunting. But the prospects are good, and Nigerians are upbeat about rebuilding their country—as is their head of state.

Macroeconomic performance 1999–2001— growth nearing 4%

When the new civilian government took over in 1999, Nigeria had abundant growth reserves—idle productive resources that could, with the right strategy, be transformed into huge growth windfalls in the short to medium term. These reserves include arable land, 60% of which lies idle; educated youth, more than 40% of whom are unemployed or underemployed; industrial capacity, whose utilization remains less than 35%; and several natural resources that go unexploited, including solid minerals and natural gas. The rate of capacity utilization in the economy today is comparable to that in most countries just emerging from conflict. Experience in such countries suggests that with serious reforms, it is possible to initiate annual growth of more than 6% a year and to sustain that growth for a time. Another huge growth reserve—though one that is abroad—is the stock of flight capital, estimated at more than twice the size of GDP. If the stock of flight capital is assumed to be only around $90 billion, a 10% annual return on that would yield some $9 billion. In essence, if the Nigerian government introduces policies and incentives encouraging the owners of the wealth to repatriate just the interest earnings, the Nigerian economy could

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gain $9 billion a year in additional investment—equivalent to 20% of GDP. Neither the required (or expected) growth nor massive repatriation of flight capital took place in 1999–2001. On all counts Nigeria is a desperately poor country. In a ranking of the world's countries by income level, Nigeria fell near the bottom, with per capita income around half the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (in purchasing power parity, or PPP, terms; table 1.1). This comparative performance is all the more disappointing given the country's abundant human and natural resources.

The GDP growth rate in 2000 was 3.8%, up from 2.8% in 1999 and higher than the 3.1% targeted in the 2000 budget (table 1.1). With population growth of around 2.9% a year, however, this growth rate translated into GDP per capita growth of less than 1.0%. Growth in 2001 was estimated to have risen slightly, to around 4.0%, despite OPEC production restrictions and the sluggishness of reforms to remove structural constraints on the private sector. The growth performance in 2001 was driven largely by favourable conditions in the non-oil sector. The oil price remained on average above the $20 a barrel used in the 2001 budget estimates, but OPEC reduced the country's production quota by around 9% in the first quarter of 2001.

Table 1.1

Nigeria in a global context, 1999

Indicator	World	Nigeria	Nigeria's world rank[a]
Population (millions)	5,975	124	10
GNP (billions of dollars)	29,232	37	54
Per capita GNP (dollars)	4,890	319	179
PPP GNP (billions of dollars)[b]	38,804	92	49
PPP GNP per capita (dollars)[b]	6,490	744	193
Human development index	0.716	0.455	136[c]
Gender-related development index	0.706	0.433	123[c]

a. Out of around 200 countries, except where otherwise noted.

b. Adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).

c. Out of 162 countries.

Source: *UNDP 2001.*

Inflation remained moderate in 2000, with the composite consumer price index rising by 6.9%, slightly more than the 6.6% in 1999. According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, two main factors led to the increased pressure on prices towards the second half of 2000: the scarcity of petroleum products and the excess liquidity in the banking system arising from the monetization of the increased oil export receipts. A good agricultural harvest moderated the effects of these factors. But a loosening of monetary policy and an increase in government spending that boosted domestic demand and money supply at a time that the exchange rate was depreciating put the pressure back on the general price level in 2001. As a result, inflation averaged an estimated 15.6% in 2001, with the prices of staple food items increasing by around 40%. Independent estimates suggest aggregate inflation of between 28% and 35%, however, with food prices increasing by around 66% in 2001.

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At around 11%, the official estimate of the oil sector's direct contribution to GDP seems small compared with its impact on the economy.1 The wider effect of the oil price boom can be inferred from the expenditure components of GDP, which are driven largely by oil revenue and foreign exchange. Gross fixed capital formation rose from 5.4% of GDP in 1999 to 7.9% in 2000—reflecting massive public sector investments financed by oil revenue (see table 1.2). Government final consumption also increased sharply in 1999, by 71%, then declined by 1.2% in 2000. In contrast, private consumption experienced a puzzling collapse in 1999, then posted a 5% increase in 2000. The government budget for 2001 had envisaged even greater capital outlays than in 2000 (around 50% more than in 2000 and 250% more than in 1999). But new procurement rules and value-for-money audits of capital projects helped to slow capital spending and prevent waste.

The oil factor—an unexpected boom

In 2000, thanks to the oil windfall, the growth rate of oil GDP improved by 4.8 percentage points compared with the 1999 growth rate. Indeed, the unexpected boom in the international oil market essentially drove the growth performance of the entire economy in 2000.

Table 1.2

Selected economic indicators, Nigeria, 1996–2002

Indicator	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001[a]	2002[b]
Real GDP growth (percent)	3.4	3.2	2.4	2.8	3.8	4.0	2.0
Oil sector growth (percent)	6.9	1.4	–4.9	–4.2	0.6	6.6	3.7
Oil production (millions of barrels a day)	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.3
Manufacturing capacity utilization (percent)	36.8	34.0	34.9	36.0	34.5	33.8	—
Gross fixed capital formation (percentage of GDP)	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.4	7.9	6.6	6.6
Inflation rate (percent)	29.3	8.5	10.0	6.6	6.9	15.6	13.3
Overall fiscal balance (percentage of GDP)	1.3	–0.2	–4.7	–8.4	–2.9	–4.3	–3.9
Broad money (M2) growth (percent)	16.8	16.9	23.3	31.6	48.1	—	—
Overall balance of payments (percentage of GDP)	–1.9	0.0	–7.8	–3.1	7.0	3.6	–2.5
Current account balance (percentage of GDP)	8.5	1.2	–11.6	0.4	5.8	3.4	–3.3
Capital account balance (percentage of GDP)	–10.2	–1.0	4.1	–3.5	–6.8	–3.8	–6.0
External reserves (billions of dollars)	4.07	7.58	7.10	5.45	9.91	9.60	9.80
Average crude oil price (dollars per barrel)	21.2	19.4	12.9	18.0	28.6	22.0	21.5
Average interbank foreign exchange market rate (naira per dollar)[c]	—	—	—	96.1	101.7	115.6	133.5
Average parallel market exchange rate (naira per dollar)	83.1	85.0	87.9	99.2	111.1	132.5	150.0

— Not available.

a. Estimated.

b. Projected.

c. The average annual official exchange rate for 1996–98 was 21.9 naira per dollar.

Source: *Central Bank of Nigeria,* Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2000, *and EIU 2001a, except for data for 2001 and 2002, which are Economic Commission for Africa estimates based on official sources, including Nigeria, Ministry of Finance 2000a.*

Oil prices rose from $18.00 a barrel in 1999 to $28.60 in 2000. Moreover, in 2000 the OPEC quota for Nigeria increased from 1.885 million barrels a day in March to 2.033 million

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in April, 2.091 million in July, 2.157 million in October, and 2.178 million in November. Of the total daily production, around 1.88 million barrels a day were exported, up from 1.66 million in 1999. Although oil is in many ways an enclave sector in Nigeria, with few forward and backward links with the rest of the economy, it is still decisive for economic performance. The oil sector accounts for around 95% of foreign exchange earnings and more than 80% of government revenue. Its impact is transmitted mostly through the income effect, mediated through public spending and imports. Much of the modern productive sector depends on imported inputs, and the oil sector provides the foreign exchange needed. Oil GDP is clearly more volatile than non-oil GDP (figure 1.1). Because of the volatility in oil prices, the sector can experience rapid growth in value added one year followed by an equally rapid decline in the next—and the wide swings in the sector's value added have historically been reflected in volatile growth rates for the economy as a whole. While non-oil GDP closely tracks total GDP, there is evidence that oil GDP leads the cyclical trend in both non-oil and total GDP. Changes in oil prices could therefore have both contemporaneous and lagged effects on general economic performance.

Figure 1.1

Oil, non-oil, and total GDP growth, Nigeria, 1981–2000



Source: *Economic Commission for Africa.*

Sectoral performance—unchanged

Agriculture dominates the Nigerian economy, contributing 41.5% of GDP in 2000 according to official data (table 1.3). Industry (including mining, manufacturing, and building and construction) contributed around 18.8% of GDP. The service sector accounted for the other 39.7%. Agriculture also provides employment for much of the population. Nonetheless, the sector has become progressively less profitable, and while Nigeria was a large exporter of agricultural products in the 1960s, it has now become a sizable importer.

Manufacturing is concentrated in a few products, with textiles, cigarettes, beverages, soaps and detergents, and cement accounting for around 60% of total manufacturing output. These subsectors have benefited from substantial foreign investment in recent years. But they are highly dependent on imports and therefore vulnerable to foreign exchange

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difficulties. Rising production costs and falling consumer demand are the main factors constraining growth in manufacturing output. Remarkably, sectoral growth rates did not change from 1999 to 2000 except for industry, which reversed its decline of the previous two years to post a growth of 2%. This trend was led by a reversal of the two-year decline in crude petroleum production, which had negative growth in 1998 (–5%) and 1999 (–7%) but posted positive growth of 1% in 2000.

Mining and quarrying maintained 3% growth in both 1999 and 2000. Agriculture maintained the strongest growth, at 5% a year. The sectors' weighted contributions to GDP growth give an aggregate growth rate of 3.84% in 2000.

Table 1.3

Growth rates and contributions to GDP growth by sector, Nigeria, 1997–2000 (percent)

	Average annual growth				Share of GDP	Contribution to GDP growth,
Sector	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2000**	**2000**
Agriculture	3.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	41.5	2.08
Industry	1.0	–4.0	–4.0	2.0	16.7	0.33
Manufacturing	0.0	–4.0	4.0	4.0	—	—
Building and construction	6.0	6.0	4.0	4.0	2.1	0.08
Wholesale and retail trade	1.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	11.6	0.23
Other services	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	28.1	1.12
Total GDP growth						3.84

Source: *Calculated on the basis of data from Central Bank of Nigeria,* Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2000.

External sector performance - big improvements, thanks to the oil windfall

External accounts improved significantly in 2000, following the positive shift in terms of trade thanks largely to the oil windfall (see table 1.2). The improvement in the external accounts is unlikely to be sustained in the short to medium term, however, as oil export earnings will probably fall in 2002. Imports did not fall proportionately because of a combination of factors—the expected increase in government capital spending, the projected growth in investment in offshore oil production, and the likely effects of further cuts in customs tariffs. Thus the surplus in the trade account declined from 5.8% of GDP in 2000 to 3.4% in 2001 and is expected to decline further in 2002. Moreover, although the inflow of official multilateral and bilateral credit and aid has increased modestly since the return of democracy, foreign assistance is expected to remain at a relatively low level as donors maintain a wait-and-see attitude towards Nigeria.

Table 1.4

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External debt, Nigeria, selected years, 1980–2002

Item	1980	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001[a]	2002[b]
Total debt (billions of dollars)	6.5	31.9	31.5	30.9	31.6	32.0	31.9	27.9	26.4
Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods	3.1	16.8	14.5	11.8	12.3	14.9	8.6	7.9	9.8
Interest payments as a percentage of exports of goods	2.4	7.3	4.9	3.5	4.5	7.7	4.4	—	—
Amortization as a percentage of exports of goods	0.7	9.5	9.6	8.3	7.8	7.1	4.2	5.3	5.0
Total debt as a percentage of GDP	10.0	113.6	89.1	86.3	95.9	92.2	78.1	72.6	73.1
Total debt as a percentage of exports	24.0	256.5	185.1	187.5	286.2	250.0	149.2	7.9	9.8
Change in debt stock (percent)	—	—	–23.8	–9.5	–7.1	–4.9	–6.6	–1.4	0.2

a. Estimated.

b. Projected.

Source: *IMF 2001b except for data for 2001 and 2002, which are from the reconciled data of Nigeria's Debt Management Office and EIU 2001b.*

Nigeria's debt problem persists, but some progress was made in 2000–01 in managing its external debt. The total debt service obligation for 2000 was around $3.6 billion, but a rescheduling arrangement reached towards the end of that year reduced the burden in 2001. Debt service arrears at the beginning of 2000 were around $19.5 billion. Even after rescheduling, the debt service owed to just the Paris Club of bilateral creditors amounted to around $3 billion, but successful negotiations reduced this to $1 billion. At the beginning of 2001 Nigeria's stock of external debt stood at $28 billion—$4 billion less than estimated by the IMF (table 1.4). (The difference can be attributed mainly to the IMF's inclusion of public enterprise debt and government-guaranteed commercial loans to non-government enterprises.) By September 2001 Nigeria's Debt Management Office had completed reconciliation meetings with 13 of the country's 14 bilateral creditors. It had also reviewed the draft bilateral agreements prepared by 12 of the 14 Paris Club creditors to which Nigeria is indebted.

In the import structure a disturbing development has been the rising share of food imports. In 2000 food accounted for 14.4% of imports, up from 8.0% in 1990. This trend suggests that Nigeria could face a food crisis in the future. Nigeria is now around the 10th most populous country in the world, and its population is projected to grow to 235–250 million by 2025. That growth will make it one of the five most populous countries, but it will be the only one in the group that is nowhere near self-sufficient in food. The rapid population growth has made it increasingly difficult for Nigeria to feed its people, and the volatility of oil exports means that the present level of food imports is not sustainable. Nigeria faces the major policy challenge of transforming its agricultural sector to feed its population.

Policy reforms and economic performance

Four major clusters of policy reforms have underpinned the economic performance of Nigeria, and their further success - or failure - will largely determine economic outcomes in the medium to long term. These reforms include:

- Managing the large fluctuations in oil revenue to ensure efficient, non-inflationary, and sustainable growth.
- Rehabilitating decaying infrastructure and institutions.
- Diversifying the economy so as to help reduce poverty.
- Adopting strategies aimed at integrating the Nigerian economy into the global and regional economies so as promote economy-wide competitiveness.

For full review of the Policy reforms and the broad policy thrusts/misplaced priorities log on to www.ndnigeria.com

Final notes

1. The IMF (1998) estimates that the oil sector contributes around 35% of GDP.
2. The sectoral shares of GDP depend on the source of data. Even within the Central Bank of Nigeria's *Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 2000*, sectoral shares vary widely depending on whether GDP is valued at 1984 factor cost or at current factor cost (compare appendix tables 5a and 5b in that report). For example, at current factor cost the share of industry (mining and manufacturing) is 31.7%, while at 1984 factor cost it is 16.7%. These differences cannot be explained solely by the differences in the deflators. The differences with IMF data are even more dramatic: the IMF (2001b) shows industry contributing the largest share, at 44.0%, compared with the 16.7% estimated by the Central Bank of Nigeria at 1984 factor prices. The data inconsistency is disturbing. The different data sources on the Nigerian economy show such marked variations that sometimes the qualitative direction of the data can change, so that the opposite inference is equally true. 3. In the annual federal budget the federal government assumes a benchmark oil price for revenue estimates. If the actual oil price exceeds the estimated price, the "excess" can be regarded as a windfall and saved against a future drop in prices. In 2000 the oil windfall amounted to $4 billion, or 10% of GDP. Around 50% of this accrued to states and local governments. A serious political debate is under way to develop a solution to the problem of managing such windfalls. 4. The National Rolling Plan for 2001–03 is the 12th in a series of medium-term, three-year plans since 1990 and the second under President Obasanjo. Used as a national development strategy, the plan covers mainly programmes and projects of the federal and state governments. The 2001–03 plan focuses primarily on poverty alleviation, managed deregulation, fiscal discipline, and privatization. 5. The IMF failed to extend the Stand-By Arrangement in 2001, on the grounds that its major benchmarks were not met. The Stand-By Arrangement was to be reviewed in the first quarter of 2002. On 6 March 2002, however, the IMF announced that it was discontinuing its informal monitoring of macroeconomic developments in Nigeria, following the Nigerian government's insistence on developing its own "home grown" programme.

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Conclusions

National prosperity depends on *competitiveness*, which reflects the productivity with which a nation uses resources. Competitiveness is rooted in a nation's microeconomic fundamentals and manifested in the nature of company operations and strategy and in the quality of the microeconomic business environment. Political stability and sound macroeconomic policies, accompanied by market opening and privatization, have long been considered the cornerstone for economic development. The results here suggest that they are necessary but not sufficient. We find strong evidence that microeconomic upgrading is a sequential process in which countries at different levels of development face distinctly different challenges. While institutions such as the IMF have strongly encouraged macro reforms, our findings suggest that micro reforms are equally if not more important. Without micro reforms, growth in GDP induced by sound macro policies will be unsustainable and will not translate into improvements in GDP per capita. Appropriate

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micro reforms, which boost productivity and productivity growth, can also greatly ease the challenge of meeting government's fiscal obligations and reducing macroeconomic distortions. A greater focus on microeconomic reforms will pay another essential dividend. While macro reforms almost inevitability inflict hardship in the short and medium run through raising interest rates and prices while cutting public expenditures, micro reforms can produce tangible and visible benefits for citizens. Regulatory reform can rapidly begin to ease inefficiencies, reduce pollution, raise product and service quality, and improve unsafe practices. Bold steps to improve education and training are particularly important, because they offer the hope of a better life for children. If Nigerians see businesses reforming themselves and having to confront tough competitive challenges, they themselves will be more willing to live with personal sacrifices and less likely to side with anti-reform interest groups. The political will and public support to make real economic change is elevated. Our results again challenge the notion that microeconomic improvement is automatic if proper macroeconomic policies are instituted. While there may be a tendency for microeconomic conditions to improve because GDP per capita rises, *such improvement appears to be far from automatic*. Moreover, the rate of improvement in current competitiveness *can be affected* markedly by purposeful action in both government and the private sector. Microeconomic conditions can move ahead of or fall behind current GDP per capita, and we find evidence that this has an influence on subsequent economic growth. Our findings indicate that it is unwise to view micro reforms only in terms of reducing the role of government and abolishing market distortions. Such steps remain a critical challenge for many countries to master. Yet government has a range of positive roles that are fundamental to prosperity, such as investments in human resources, building innovative capacity, and stimulating advanced demand via regulatory standards. Nigeria need to move beyond first stage reforms and address these agendas. Also, the private sector has an important role in improving a nation's competitive platform through collective activities and cluster development initiatives. Second-stage micro reforms require a new perspective on the role of the private sector. Our research also highlights the need to set a nation's economic priorities to be consistent with its level of development. We analyzed how the challenges are different for low-, medium-, and high-income countries. Especially challenging are the difficult transitions between development stages. Countries that have been very successful in one stage of development, such as Taiwan and Singapore in the Investment-Driven stage, need to recognize the multifaceted adjustments needed to manage the transition to the Innovation-Driven stage. If there is to be a forceful momentum for economic reform in Nigeria, there is then the pressing need to move to the next level of thinking and practice. Protests at international meetings should be a wake-up call that economic reform must move beyond now standard approaches, and embrace domestic competition, stringent environmental standards, and policies that meaningfully boost the skills and opportunities of citizens. Countries are converging on macroeconomic policies, and strong market forces penalize any nation that fails to reform in this arena. The central challenge to the world economy is now microeconomic reform, but reform that moves beyond past approaches. Progress in improving the sophistication of companies and the quality of the business environment is the only way to produce real improvements in efficiency, product quality, new business opportunities, and a rising standard of living for citizens.

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SHORT BIO

Dr Baba Jibrin Adamu
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Dr. Engr. Baba J ADAMU: was born in Kaduna (Unguwan Liman), Kaduna State, Nigeria. Dr. Baba Jibrin Adamu is the youngest son of the late Malam Alhaji Adamu Jibrin Imam, the former Chief Imam of Kaduna State Central Mosque located in Kano Road Kaduna. Dr. Baba J Adamu represented Kaduna State based on academic qualification to go on a scholarship program to study Civil Engineering up to Masters Degree in Poland in 1986. Having completed successfully his M.Sc in 1993, again based on academic excellence received a Polish Government Scholarship to continue to do Doctorate degree in Industrial Research and silo/bunker Technology. Dr. Adamu specializes in Silos and Security Bunker technology and completed his Ph.D in 2000 with Excellence. He then moved to Toronto, Canada in 2000, where is acquired various Certificates in IT, Management and Business at Humber College Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning, Toronto Ontario, as well as at the Banf Academy for Business, Calgary, Alberta, CANADA. He now lives and works in Canada as an Engineering/Security Consultant and as the President and CEO of iNetwoks Canada, a Managed Technology Solution company based in Toronto. As of this writing, dr Adamu is undergoing United Nations training on Global Terrorism, Law of Arm Conflict and UN working System through the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR POCI), New York, USA.

Dr Adamu has tremendous experience in management of men and materials in private sector, good knowledge of international and Nigerian political, economic and social environment, high level of integrity, evidence of personal discipline as well as courage of conviction. He has a strong conviction for the respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, beliefs in popular participation and consultation, knowledge and understanding of the working of the international system, voluntary service to the community, sense of history and lesson, competence in concepts and tools of development and respect for African value and cherished all Nigerian traditions. Dr Adamu is an expert both in Structural engineering and . In his own words:

"**W**here despair and hopelessness exist, those who have the ability to take action have the moral responsibility to take action to help those who live on the bare edge of survival. And democracy is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we must carry, a trust we must bear and pass along. And even after all these years, we have a long way yet to travel, that is why **We must all be involved ...**" - *Baba Jibrin Adamu, Ph.D Engr.*

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